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VALUE OF CONSIDERATION

FIXING THE VALUE OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUE
OF STOCK

THE nineteenth-century era of corporate expansion provided
great impetus to the practice of "stock watering.' ' The lack
of restrictions on corporate activity during this period and the
resulting ease with which stock could be watered caused the several states to enact statutes and adopt constitutional provisions
which attempted to restrict the consideration for the issue of
stock to certain named classifications. Texas was no exception, and
Article XII, § 6 of the Constitution of 1876 provides that "No
corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for money paid,
labor done or property actually received, and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void." 2 The Legislature
soon found that this provision was not effective to prohibit corporations from watering stock and made an attempt to fix the amount
of the consideration which must be received in payment for stock.
These provisions are now incorporated in articles 1308 and 1353
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.' It is the purpose of this note
to determine, by analysis of the scope and operation of these

I "'Watered' stock is stock issued for a bonus or otherwise without consideration, or
for a less sum of money than the par value, or for labor, services, or property, which ata
fair valuation is less than the par value." Thomason v. Miller, 4 S. W. (2d) 668, 670
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
2 "Issued," as used in the above article, means delivered. Zapp v. Spreckels, 204 S. W.
786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) ; Smith v. McAdams, 206 S. W. 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918);
In O'Bear-Nester Glass Co. v. Antiexplo Co., 101 Tex. 432, 108 S.W. 967, 109 S. W. 931
(1908), the Supreme Court said: "The purpose of the convention in enacting that provision of the Constitution was to secure creditors as well as stockholders of corporations
against the practice which was too common of corporations issuing fictitious stock and
stock upon an insufficient consideration, whereby the actual capital was much less than
the amount represented by the shares issued and sold by the corporation. The terms in
which this section of the Constitution is expressed indicated the purpose that the assets
of the corporation should be something substantial, and of such a character that they
could be subjected to the payment of claims against the corporation as well as to secure
the shareholders in their rights in the capital stock." 108 S.W. at 968.
a Tsz. Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 1308, 1353.
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provisions, whether they are effective or were, and remain, too
general in character to accomplish their aim.
The problems arising under such provisions of what constitutes "labr done" or "property actually received" and of what
value to affix thereto remained for the courts. In view of the very
nature of the problems presented, it is not surprising that the
decisions of the courts have not been harmonious. The provision
as to money payment presents no real difficulty so Iong as the
money is actually paid before the stock is issued.' In construing
the phrase "labor done" the Texas courts have held that the services of an attorney in aiding the corporation will support a stock
issue under the Constitutional provision." On the other hand the

services of a promoter rendered prior to the incorporation have
generally been held not to amount to valid consideration for the
issue of stock." And to much the same effect would be any agree.
ment to render services in the future.- With reference to "property actually received" the courts have held that a franchise.' oil
lease." se(ttred note,'" contract of value such as an option con4 Stock may not be issued until the purchaser's contract to pay has been fully performed. Turner v. Cattleman's Trust C .. , 215 S. W. 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) : San
Antonio Irrigation Co. v. Deutschmann. 102 Tex. 201. 105 S. W. 486 (1907), rev'd. 102
Tex. 201,114 S. W. 1174 (1908).
:' Stevens v. Episcopal Church History Co., 140 App. Div. 570, 125 N. Y. Stipp. 53
(1910) : Hackney v. York, 18 S. W. (2dm 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
' Cooney v. Arlington Hotel Co., 11 Del. Ch. 286. 101 Atd. 879 (1917) ; Stevens v.
Episcopal Church History Co., 140 App. Div. 570, 125 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1910t ; Weather.
ford, M. W. & N. Ry. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S. W. 795 (1894). But see (1937)
15 Tr.x. L. REv. 464, 472 suggesting that the TEXAS SEcURITIES ACT §§ 5(d), 7, approve$
such a practice.
7 Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel, 11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 Atd. 879 (1917); McCombs
Producing and Refining Co. v. Ogle, 200 Ky. 208, 254 S. W. 425 (1923)
Lothrop v.
Gowdeau, 142 La. 342, 76 So. 794 (1917) B and C Electrical Const. Co. v. Owen, 176
App. Div. 399, 163 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1917); Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., 165 App. Div. 89,
150 N. Y. Supp. 668 (1914) ; Stevens v. Episcopal Church History Co., 140 App. Div. 570,
125 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1910).
8 Barthold v. Thomas, 210 S. W. 506 (Tex. Com. App. 1919).
9 Cassidy v. Homer, 86 Okl. 220, 208 Pac. 775 (1922) ; McAlister v. Eclipse Co., 128
Tex. 449,98 S. W. (2d) 171 (1936) ; Peden Iron and Steel Co. v. Jenkins, 203 S. W. 180
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (e.r.).
-' Sohland v. Baker. 15 Del. Ch. 431. 141 At. 277 (1927); Ham v. Smith, 85 Okl.
137, 204 Pac. 642 (1922) ; Cole v. Adams, 92 Tex. 171, 46 S. W. 790 (1898) ; Lone Star
Life Ins. Co. v. Shield, 228 S. W. 196 (Tex. Com. App. 1921); Lumpkin v. Brown, 229
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tract," and patents'' come within Article XII, § 6 of the Constitution and similar provisions in other jurisdictions. Some items are
deemed by the courts to have such an uncertain and speculative
value as not to constitute "property actually received," e.g., an
unsecured note," unpatented formulas," trade-marks,'" inventions
of a highly speculative nature,"' and the use of a name, prestige
or influence of an individual.'"
A difficulty for the courts even greater than that of determining
the acceptability of the various types of consideration for stock
is that of the methods to be used in deciding whether to accept
or reject the valuation placed by the directors upon the property
thus received. The majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, have
committed themselves to the so-called "good faith" test when
S. W. 498 (Tex. Com. App. 1921) : Prtdential Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Pearson. 222
S. W. 967 (Tex. Com. App. 1920): Brownfield State Bank v. Hudson. 73 S. W. t21) 140
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Penland v. Schramm, 232 S. W. 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)
General Bonding and Casualty Ins. C,. v. Mosely, 110 Tex. 529, 222 S. W. 961 (1920t.
"1General Bonding and Casuahy Ins. Co. v. Mosely, 110 Tex. 529, 222 S. W. 961
(1920): Cole v.Adams. 92 Tex. 171. 46 S. W. 790 (1898).
'-Atlas Trailers and Water .Mulfflers v. McCallum, 12 S. W. (2d) 957 (Tex. Com. App.
1929) and cases cited therein.
2" Thompson v. First State Bank of Amarillo. 109 Tex. 419, 211 S. W. 977 (1919).
afl'g 189 S. W. 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Washer v.Smyer. 109 Tex. 398, 211 S. W. 985
(19191 ; Bank v. Spencer. 244 S. W. 123 (Tex. Com. App. 1922) ; Rouseau v. Everett.
209 S. W. 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) : Kanaman v. Gahagan, 185 S. W. 619 (Tex. Civ.
App. 19161 ; Mason v. First Natinal Bank of Paint Rock, 156 S. W. 366 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913).
'' O'Bear-N,-ter Glass Co. v. Antiexplh Co.. 101 Tex. 431, 108 S: W. 967, 109 S. W.
931 119081.
I-"In thtcase ifa trade mark, whether assignable or not, the difficulties which would
confront you in a'.certaining its money value need not be dwelt upon, because such a
value, however great or small it may be, is practically unaseertainable." (1916-1918)
BIENNIAL REPORIT OF TliE \ITORNEY GENERAt. OF TEx.s 233, 236, op. 1867.
" In O*Bear-Nester Glass Co. v. Antiexplo Co., 101 Tex. 431, 108 S. W. 967, 969
(1908), it was stated that "The qualified property right of thediscoverer of an unpatented formula. is of such a character that it constitutes no substantial property, and
could not under any circumstances be subjected to the payment of the debts of the corporations, nor could the shareholders have it sold and the proceeds distributed by process
of court. Such nnstibstantial and shadowy right when delivered in payment of stock constitutes no payment within the terms of the above quoted section of otr Constitution."
"-Bowen v. Imperial Theatres, 13 Del. Ch. 120, 115 Atd. 918 (1922) ;B and C Electric
Const. Co. v. Owen, 176 App. Div. 399, 163 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1917) ; Webster v. Webster
Refining Co., 36 OkI. 168, 128 Pac. 261 (1912).
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questioning the acts of the directors,"9 i.e., these courts accept
the valuation made by the directors as conclusive if made in good
faith. A minority of courts have used as a standard the "true
value" rule which supposedly ignores the good or bad faith of
the directors, as the case may be, and presents instead the question of whether the property is actually worth the value placed
upon it by the directors."
Whether the "good faith" or the 'true value" standard be
adopted by the court in reviewing the acts of the directors where
there is an allegation of fraud or that the valuation by the directors was unreasonable, it still remains for the courts in some manner to define the term "value." Texas, in article 1308, 0 requires
that the stock may be issued for the "actual value at which it was
taken or at which the property was received." Other states having similar provisions use such terms as "value,"' "fair value,"2 2
and "market value. '2' These formulae, with the possible exception of market value, do not of themselves indicate to the attorney
18Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343 (1886); Kaye v. Metz, 186 Cal. 42,
198 Pac. 1047 (1921) ; Home Savings Bank of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Realty
Co., 176 Cal. 731, 171 Pac. 290 (1917) ; U. S. Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Henry
Vogt Mach. Co.,182 Ky. 473,206 S. W. 806 (1918) ; New Bern Tire Co. v. Kirkman and
Cobb, 193 N. C.534, 137 S.E. 585 (1927) ;Clevenger v.Moore, 71 N. J.Law 148, 58 Ad.
88 (1904) ; Krebs v. Oberrender, 274 Pa. 154, 118 At1. 19 (1922). That intentional overvaluation is fraud as a matter of law, see Kaye v. Metz,supra; Zierath v. Claggett, 46 Cal.
App. 15, 188 Pac. 837 (1920) ; Bryson v. Conlen, 104 N. J. Eq. 180, 144 Ad. 723 (1929) ;
Atwell v. Schmitt, 111 Or. 96, 225 Pac. 325 (1924). For cases admitting gross overvaluation as evidence of fraud, see Zierath v. Claggett, supra; Compton v. Perkins, 144 Or.
346, 24 P. (2d) 670 (1933).
Peden Iron and Steel Co. v. Jenkins, 203 S. W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), advocates
the good faith test while Cole v. Adams, 92 Tex. 171, 46 S. W. 790 (1898) followed the
true value test. Since the Peden Iron and Steel case was the later decision, it would
appear that Texas could now be classified as a "good faith" state. But see 2 HoLDEBRAND,
TEXAs CoapoRaroNs (1942) § 304, where it is contended that Cole v. Adams states the
Texas position.
19 Bobb v. Walmar Theater Co., 206 Mo. App. 236, 227 S.W. 841 (1921) ; Sheppard
v. Larkin, 226 S. W. 1021 (Mo. App. 1921) ; Electromatic Cooling Co. v. Milne-RyanGibson, Inc., 160 Wash. 320, 294 Pac. 1113 (1931) ; see Hastings v. Scott, 248 S. W. 973
(Mo. App. 1923), where latitude was allowed in arriving at value of property difficult
of determination.
2
0 TE. Rav. Ctv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1308.
21 ML Rav. STAT. (1944) c. 49, § 18; N. C. Gr.N. STAT. (1943) c. 55, § 55-63.
22
MINN. STAT. (1945) c. 301, 1 301.15.
23 Ky. REv. STAT. (1946) c. 271, § 271.175.
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or the courts how the meaning of the statutory term is to be determined nor what is to be taken into consideration in the valuation
of the property received or labor done. Nor has the Securities and
Exchange Commission attempted to set a standard of value; as
aptly stated by Mr. Bonbright, "The commission has not undertaken to define 'value' or to dictate the methods of valuation.
Instead, it insists that the appraiser himself explain what he means
by the term, without dodging the issue by resort to misleading
undefined phrases like 'sound value'."
If die item in question has an ascertainable market value, this
might well be used as the true test of value. The Texas Court of
Civil Appeals, in Peden Iron and Steel Co. v. Jenkins, where the
problem was one of fixing the value of an oil lease, made the
following statement:
"It is further argued, attd with apparent truth, that the general rule
is that the true test of the value of a thing is what it will bring on the

market. But, to constitute market value, it must appear that similar
things have been bought and sold in the way of trade in sufficient quantity or frequency to establish a market value for such things; that, where
there is no market value for the thing. its value must then be ascertained
by the circumstances of the case, the intrinsic value of the thing, the
cost of it, its uses, the price asked and offered for it, and, indeed, any
facts which would naturally affect the mind of parties buying or selling
in determining the price asked or given. '"5

Thus, where there is an ascertainable market value the court will
admit testimony establishing that value according to the prevailing rules of evidence. This testimony will usually be as to the
price for which similar property is selling in the particular lo6
cality.2
2 BONBRICHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 809, n. 23.
5203 S. W. 180, 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'-"Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946) ; Loud v.
Solomon, 188 Mich. 7, 154 N. W. 73 (1915) ; Peden Iron and Steel Co. v. Jenkins, 203
S. W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). "Where the other sales were sufficiently near in time,
and the other land was located sufficiently near the land in question and was sufficiently
alike with respect to character and improvements to make it clear that the price paid for
such tracts has probative value in determining the value of the land in question, the other
sales are received by most courts." McCoRMICK AND RAY, TE.XAs LAW OF EvwE'ic.
::4
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If the market value of the property cannot be determined,
then the court will have to resort to a determination of the actual
value. It has been said that "Actual value or intrinsic value may
not be shown unless it first be shown that there was no market
price established by comparable sales.'" 7 In its determination of
the actual or intrinsic value the difficulties with which the court
is faced are at times insurmountable, and it is not surprising
that there is yet no standard of value which is applicable in every
case. The courts have, however, considered the items mentioned
in Peden Iron and Steel Co. v. Jenkins as evidence of value and
have then "totalled" these items, assuming this "total" would be
the proper valuation for the property given in exchange for the
stock in the case to be decided. The first of these items of evidence
might well be classified as "cost,' ' 2 which could be broken down
into several sub-classifications such as "original cost of the property," "cost of reproducing the property," and "cost to the promoter." Although these classifications have not received equal
weight in the eyes of the courts as items of evidence, they have all
been used in the attempts to arrive at a proper valuation of the
property.
The original cost of the property would have little weight in
the determination if other evidence were available, inasmuch as
the court is concerned with the value of the property at the time
of the exchange for the stock of the corporation and not at the
time of the original investment. This becomes apparent when there
has been a considerable lapse of time between the date of purchase and the date of the exchange. The use of this item as conclusive evidence of overvaluation of the property when there is
(1937) 1699. "Questions of degree of similarity and nearness of time and distance neces.
sary to render testimony of sales of other property admissable to show value of condemned property is not determined by inflexible rule, but rests largely in the discretion
of the trial judge." City of Houston v. Pillot, 73 S. W. (2d) 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
17 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F. (2d) 196, 201 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946) ; see
Babbitt v. Read, 215 Fed. 395, 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1914), where the court states that "Value,
of course, means market value."
2s For a complete and exhaustive treatise on valuation and particularly a discussion
of "cost" in general, see Dow, S-rocK WATMKNC (1930) 111.
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a wide discrepancy between original cost and the exchange price
to the corporation would result in an unjust hardship on the corporation as well as on the promoter, this hardship being especially
apparent during times of rapid price fluctuation. It is only when
the original purchase and the transfer occur within a short period
of tine or when no material change in economic conditions has
occurred that the original cost of the property may be taken to
be the present value of that property. The Securities and Exchange
Commission has apparently used original cost as an item of evidence in valuing property.
In considering the cost of reproduction as evidence of value
it is necessary to arrive first at some understanding as to what is
meant by the term "reproduction cost." Does it mean the cost of
reproducing the exact item of property? Or does it mean the cost
of reproducing an item which will render an equivalent service?
The value established for the item will not be the same under the
two meanings when there have been technological advances made
in the particular field under consideration."' In a determination
whether there was a overvaluation at the time of exchange for
stock in the corporation, the term would necessarily have to mean
the cost of reproducing the exact item. If so, the question would
then arise whether this cost could properly be used to determine
the present value of the property? If this inquiry is answered in
the affirmative, it then becomes necessary to arrive at the cost
of reproduction at the time the property was exchanged for the
stock in the corporation, which (hie to the lap,:e of time since the
exchange may prove difficult to such an extent as to be impractical.
And even if these difficulties can be met and overcome, the test
would be useful only in regard to those properties which are capable of reproduction. There are items such as patents and oil leases
which are considered as property and which are at the same time
practically incapable of being reproduced. Thus an attempt to
In the Matter of Winnebago Distilling Company, 6 S. E. C. 926 (1940).

2-,

:- Twt.oa. FINANCIAL POLICIES OF BesiNF.ss ENTERPRISE (1942) 614.
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apply the test of cost of reproduction to such items would be an
impossible task. It has been contended, however, by at least one
court that, where property is capable of reproduction, the "cost
of the physical reproduction is the test."" It may be suggested
that this test should never be made conclusive if other evidence is
available in view of the failure of such a test to take into consideration the possible uniqueness which the particular property
may have had to the corporation involved.
Where a promoter has purchased the property and then transfers itto the corporation in exchange for stock, the cost to the
promoter should be considered but not made conclusive except in
those instances where the discrepancy between the price paid by
him and the price at which he exchanged the property for stock
is so excessive as to make it appear that the promoter was taking
unfair advantage of the corporate needs. The profit derived by
the promoter in such an exchange must be within the limits of
reasonableness or the court will consider such profit strong evidence of bad faith and consequently will hold the property to be
overvalued if no other evidence is available.' 2 This is true particularly in those cases where the promoters are later the directors
of the corporation and sell the property to themselves in exchange
for paid-up stock." As in the case of reproduction cost this type
of evidence, if made conclusive, does not take into consideration
the possible uniqueness of the property to the corporation; yet
this is an item which the directors consider when valuing the
property and which should properly be considered by the courts.
Thus it would seem that "cost" in general should be considered
by the court in its valuation of the consideration exchanged for
stock, but that it should not be made conclusive except in those
cases where no other evidence is available; and even then due
regard should be given to the uniqueness of the item as well as
S1 See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq. 36,61 Ad. 843, 847 (1905).

2
In re Phoenix Hardware Co., 249 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
93 AtweU v. Schmitt, 111 Or. 96, 225 Pac. 325 (1924).
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to the enthusiasm of the directors or the promoters, as the case
may be.
In considering earning capacity as an item evidencing the value
of property to be exchanged, it is necessary to classify the property exchanged depending upon whether the property has demonstrated that it has an earning capacity or whether the property
has not yet made a "return," as in the case of a mine which has
not been tested. In cases involving property of the first class there
would seem to be no doubt that earning capacity should be a
factor to be considered in valuing the property. Should the estimated future earning capacity also be considered as well as the
past and present earning capacity? Evidently this would be considered where the past and present earning power has been established. As was said by the New Jersey Court of Chancery in Rail.
way Review v. Grog Dr.ll and Machine Co.,
'It may be assumed, as held in See v. Hoppenheimer, 69 N. J.Eq. 36,
61 Atl. 843. that prospective profits, arising from the new conditions
created by the transfer, are not elements that can be considered in ascertaining value for which stock can be issued. But it cannot be doubted
that established past and present earning capacity may be made a

proper basis of valuation in appropriate circumstances .... Nor is it
possible for any intelligent purchaser to wholly disregard future pros-

pects. While our statute may not contemplate the capitalization of pros-

pective future profits. it is clear that no present earning capacity can be
made the intelligent basis of valuation without due consideration of

future profits; but where there are prospects of increased future earning capacity, the present earning capacity demonstrated by actual operation clearly affords a proper basis of valuation of a business of this
peculiar nature, if the future prospects are not also capitalized." 34

The Railway Review case involved the valuation of a patent to be
used on railroads and which was already standard on other roads,
thus making a determination of the past and present earning capacity relatively simple."
As to cases involving property from which there has been no
24 84 N. J. Eq. 321, 91 At. 1021 (1914), aft'd, 96 Atd. 1103 (1915).
35
Grant v. East and West R. R. of Ala., 54 Fed. 569 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893).
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past or present earning derived, the court is hesitant to consider
the possibility of such future profits. Vice-Chancellor Leaming in
the case of Wolcou v. Waldstein, in which it was sought to place
a value on property which had been considered by the directors
in the light of estimated earning capacity, made the observation
that
'The nearest approach to a justification of the valuation placed upon
the property is to be found in the claim that the circumstances which
existed at the time the valuation was determined upon may have justified a reasonable expectation that the corporation under proper management would develop an earning capacity proportionate to its capitalization. Future prospects or prospects of future profits can never
beproperly ignored in any intelligent valuation of property; but it is
well settled that under our stature such prospective future profits
cannot be made the basis of valuation for purposes of capitalization
in a new enterprise with neither present nor demonstrated earning
capacity."31
It would seem that any inquiry as to the earning capacity of an
item which has not demonstrated its capacity to earn would be of
such a speculative nature as not to warrant reliance by the court
in its determination of value. This would seem necessary in view
of the inability-thus far of society to eliminate or control the business cycle with its periods of depression and prosperity and with
no known method of forecasting when the cyclical changes will
occur. Under such a system the promoters and the directors
might put great faith in the earning capacity of a certain article
while in the midst of a short-lived period of prosperity which is
creating at the moment a great demand for the article or service
they are marketing.
The valuation of mines presents a problem in which a certain
3686 N. J. Eq. 63, 97 At. 951, 952 (1916); Hasson v. Koeberle. 180 Cal. 359, 181
Pac. 387, 390 (1919), where the court -aid that "... it is evident that future earning
capacity rather than present cash value was adopted as a .iandard. We do not mean to
my that prospective earning capacity, properly subordinated to other modes of ascertaining value, may not be considered in determining present cash value. We are compelled
to conclude, however, that the court adopted a prospective earning power as the standard
of value, and did not consider it as merely some evidence of present cash value which
upon a review of the cases we take to be the standard approved by them."
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amount of speculation would have to be involved in any criteria
of value that may be accepted."' Fixing the value of this type of
property involves a question of hypothetical exchange: What

would a reasonably prudent purchaser, under the circumstances,
be willing to pay for the property?' It was said in the early Illinois case of Tuck v. Downing and is, for the most part, true today
that
"No man, however scientific he may be, could certainly state how a
mine, with the most flattering outcrop or blowout, will finally turn out.
It is to be fully tested and worked by men of skill and judgment. Mines
are not purchased and sold on a warranty, but on the prospect. The sight
determines the purchase. If very flattering, a party is willing to pay
largely for the chance. There is no other sensible or known mode of selling this kind of property. It is, in the nature of things utterly speculative, and everyone knows the business is of the most fluctuating and
hazardous character. How many mines have not sustained the hopes

created by their outcrop!" 39

The courts, however, do not accept a naked speculation as evidence but will require some evidence to support the contentions
of the promoters or directors as to the value."' What then should
comprise this evidence? The Securities and Exchange Commission
evidently requires an appraisal by a qualified engineer or one
otherwise qualified. In the Matter of Great Dike Gold Mines, Inc.,
the Commission, in commenting on the value of the mine as estimated by an accountant without experience as an appraiser of gold
mining property, said that the report of the engineer "was not
37 Clinton Mining and Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919);
Hyaxns v. Calumet and Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
BS Hasson v. Koeberle, 180 Cal. 359, 181 Pac. 387, 390 (1919): "It was the duty of
the court to determine this value by ascertaining as nearly as possible what a reasonably
prudent investor who contemplated spending his own money would have been willing to
pay for the Ord Mountain claims under the circumstances under which the corporators
acted on the date of the transfer."
3s 76 I1. 71, 94 (1875).
40 In Babbitt v. Read, 215 Fed. 395, 416 (S. D. N. Y., 1914), where the problem was
the valuation of coal property, the court said: "But the difficulty is that there is no proof
in this regard as to what, if any, increase in value, as such, there was between the units
considered separately and these units when aggregated into a field of 47,000 acres; and
plaintiff is right when he insists that the evidence fails to show a basis upon which added
combination value may be figured."
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made upon the basis of any examination by sampling; and according to [his] testimony may have been made merely after he
had 'just superficially glanced at it'.". Regarding the elements
of an appraisal, the Commission, in the Matter of Breeze Corpo.
ration, said that
"If an appraisal, or a representation of value purportedly based
thereon, is not to be misleading, the appraisal must meet two tests. In the
first place, as we have observed in a previous opinion, 'an appraisal
purports to be more than an arbitrary determination of value. It seeks
to attach value to objects as a consequence of method.' In the matter
of Haddam Distillers Corporation, 1 S.E.C. 37, 42 (1934). In other
words, it is misleading to represent as an appraisal a valuation which
is not based solely on scientific method, but which rests in whole, or
even in part, upon foundations that are arbitrary or capricious. In the
second place, there must be a fair and accurate application of the
methods purported to be followed.... The fact that valuations are in
of judgment does not warrant a departhe final analysis expressions
42
ture from these standards."

In placing a value on a patent, an engineer employed by the Securities and Exchange Commission testified
"... that there were four accepted bases for appraising a patent, viz.,

(1) the amount of an actual cash sale between parties dealing at arm's
length with each other; (2) the amount of a bona fide cash offer to
purchase made by a financially responsible person; (3) a capitalization
of the royalties obtained from a patent; and (4) a capitalization of
those earnings of a company that were strictly attributable to a patent.
He testified that in the absence of information upon which one of the
foregoing criteria of value would be applied, any value given to a patent
would not be an appraisal in the technical sense, but would be a guess,
and that in such case, it was impossible to assign more than a nominal
value to a patent. The assignment of value to a patent application as
distinguished from a granted patent presents an a fortiori case, since
there is involved ' the additional contingency that letters patent may
never be issued."
4

Thus the problem of fixing the value of the consideration for
the issue of stock or of reviewing the valuation after it has been
S.E.C. 621,626 (1936).
S.E.C. 709, 717 (1938).
,3 In the Matter of Peterson Engine Co., Inc.. 2 S.E.C. 893 (1937).
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established by the corporation is a matter of particular cases depending on the nature of the subject matter involved, and no single
principle or standard can be said to be applicable in every case.
The proper valuation, in the final analysis, is a matter of bargain
and exchange between the parties interested in the transaction,
and it is only where one or more of the parties do not act in good
faith or where the valuation was unreasonable that the court will
be concerned with the problem. Judicial difficulties could be
greatly obviated if standards were set up which would, to a great
extent, prevent the problem from arising. Under the present Texas
procedure for incorporating, the Secretary of State is required
to approve all valuations made by the directors before the charter
will be issued." This involves simply a review of the valuations
already made by other parties. To carry this method one step
further, the Secretary of State might be required to make the
initial valuations. This could be done by requiring any corporation contemplating an exchange of stock for property to notify
the Secretary of State of that fact and also to describe the property and give its location. Unbiased appraisers, experts in their
field and employees of the Secretary of State, could then make
an actual appraisal of the property and arrive at the value. Notice
would then be sent to the corporation that stock could be issued
in exchange for the particular property in question to an amount
not in excess of the value found by the appraisers. The actual
valuation would then be taken out of the hands of the corporation and placed within the duties of the Secretary of State, or
possibly of the Securities Commissioner. Thus it would be possible to avoid over-valuation resulting from excessive enthusiasm
on the part of directors or promoters, as well as intentional overvaluations, both of which result in "watered" stock. While it
might be argued that such a power to regulate would be excessive,
yet abuses thereof could be guarded against by a provision for
an appeal from the valuation as set by the office of the Secretary
4"'l'x.

R-v. Civ.
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of State to the courts in those cases where fraud is alleged on the
part of the appraisers, or where it is alleged that the appraisers
departed materially from a scientific method of appraisal. A
similar system to the one suggested above has been embodied in
the general incorporation statutes of Iowa which provide for an executive council.'" Some regulation, more stringent than any imposed by existing statutes, seems desirable for the protection of
those investors and creditors who rely on the appearance of the
corporate condition.
John R. Carrell.
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